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Sometimes the most interesting aspects of a Supreme Court opinion
lie beneath the surface. An unarticulated premise or language which is
not fully developed may contain the seeds of a new principle which has
the potential to germinate and later reshape constitutional doctrine. In
recent years opinions dealing with procedural aspects of the death pen-
alty have been among the most likely to contain such seeds.1 The
Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith2 provides another example of this phe-
nomenon. 3 Buried in the Court's opinion are two unarticulated princi-
ples which could have wide ramifications. Exploring these principles
will be the primary focus of this article.
Even on the surface, the decision in Smith is significant and surpris-
ing. Identifying trends in Supreme Court doctrine is always hazardous;
but since the early seventies, the Burger Court has shown a strong dis-
taste for the doctrine established by the Warren Court in its landmark
decision of Miranda v. Arizona.4 Beginning with Harris v. New York, 5 a
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I wish to thank Yale Kamisar of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School and my colleague Tom Gerety for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this article and Linda Tobin for her valuable research assistance.
1 One explanation for this may be that in deciding such cases the Court will necessarily
be torn between a desire for establishing a procedural rule which will have due regard for the
interests of law enforcement and a concern for providing procedural fairness for capital de-
fendants. Unless the Court chooses to establish special procedural protections for capital de-
fendants, Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980), the attempt to resolve this conflict is likely
to create a degree of ambivalence in the Court's analysis.
2 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
3 For other examples, see, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). For a comment on the seeds contained in Lockett, see Hertz &
Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penaly of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to
Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317 (1981). For an extensive discus-
sion of the hidden implications of Witherspoon, see Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1980).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 401 U.S. 222 (1971). For an incisive analysis of the Court's decision in Harris, see Der-
showitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerg-
ing Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J. 1198 (1971).
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case decided during Chief Justice Burger's first term on the Court, the
Court adopted a posture which was unsympathetic to constitutional
claims predicated upon an applicatiofn of the Miranda decision. 6 Lan-
guage from Miranda was rejected as dicta 7 or was interpreted so as to
result in a rejection of the particular Miranda claim before the Court.8
Moreover, the Court not only refused to extend Miranda to new situa-
tions,9 but strongly intimated that application of Miranda would be con-
fined to the particular coercive environment which that case involved.'0
During 1980, the Court decided two cases which to some degree
ameliorated the concerns of those who favor prophylactic constitutional
limitations upon police tactics used to induce confessions. While re-
jecting a Miranda claim on its facts, Rhode Island v. Innis I to some extent
resucitated Miranda by defining "interrogation" within the meaning of
Miranda in relatively broad terms.' 2 Also, United States v. Henry' 3 pro-
vided additional protection to arraigned or indicted defendants by
adopting a surprisingly liberal interpretation of the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel. 14 Nevertheless, with one relatively minor
exception,' 5 the Burger Court's record of refusing to hold "a single item
6 This trend was clearly identified by commentators. In 1977, Professor Stone's incisive
analysis of twelve of the Burger Court's post-Miranda decisions led him to conclude that the
court was embarked upon a gradual dismantling of Miranda. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in
the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 169. In 1978, Professor Kamisar, in his classic analy-
sis of the Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), foresaw even more
portentious signs for supporters of Miranda. Based upon his analysis of the various opinions in
Brewer, Professor Kamisar suggested that the Court might be prepared to jettison Miranda
and replace it with a modified version of the sixth amendment rule established by the Warren
Court in its 1964 decision ofMassiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Kamisar, Brewer
v. Wlliams, Massiah, andMiranda: What ir "Interrogation'"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L. J. 1
(1978), reisnnted in Y. KAMIsAR, CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 139-224 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ESSAYS IN LAW].
7 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224 (rejecting dicta that statements obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda may not be used for the purpose of impeachment).
8 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100-07 (1975) (interpreting Miranda's command that
"the interrogation must cease" when the suspect indicates that he "wishes to remain silent" so
as to allow the police to resume interrogating a defendant who aserted his right to remain
silent under the particular circumstances involved in that case. For an incisive analysis of
Mosky, see Stone, supra note 6, at 129-37.
9 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 68-71 infia).
10 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (discussed in text accompanying notes 73-82
infra) .
11 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
12 See note 93 infia. See generaly White, nterrogtaion Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis
and United States o. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1209, 1224-36 (1980).
13 447 U.S. 264 (1980). See text accompanying note 153 infra.
14 See generally White, supra note 12, at 1236-41.
15 In Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) the Court in a per curiam decision held
that in a case where "no evidence at all was introduced to prove that [the defendant] ...
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights before making [an]... inculpatory statement,"
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of evidence inadmissible on authority of Miranda"'6 was still intact until
May 18, 1981.17
Against this backdrop, the Court's decision in Smith appears sur-
prising. In that case a majority of the Court went out of its way to
decide a Miranda issue in favor of the defendant. Moreover, as an in-
dependent basis for decision, the Court unanimously concluded that the
defendant's sixth amendment right to an attorney was violated. The
Court's analysis of the Miranda issue in Smith constitutes an extension of
Miranda and, apparently, a shift in the Burger Court's view of the un-
derpinnings of that doctrine. While less clear, the Court's analysis of the
sixth amendment issue is also doctrinally significant in that, at least in
the context of the situation presented in Smith, it appears to redefine the
nature of the sixth amendment right.
In dealing with the fifth and sixth amendment issues, the Court
placed relatively little emphasis upon the fact that these issues arose in
the context of a capital case. Nevertheless, examination of the major-
ity's analysis indicates that the implications of this analysis will have
special significance for capital defendants. Specifically, the implications
of Smith -sanalysis touch upon the safeguards applicable when a capital
defendant's waiver of constitutional rights is at issue. The implications
suggest first, that a valid waiver under Miranda cannot take place unless
the capital defendant is informed that he is charged with an offense car-
rying a possible sentence of death, and, second, that at least in situations
where a capital defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights are both
applicable, consultation between the capital defendant and his attorney
will be a prerequisite to a valid waiver of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right. In order to explore these implications of Smith, it is neces-
sary to begin by explaining the circumstances presented in that case and
then go on to consider the implications of the Court's two lines of consti-
tutional analysis.
I. THE DECISION IN SMITH V. ESTELLE' 8
Defendant Ernest Smith was indicted in Texas for murder, arising
from his participation in an armed robbery in which his accomplice shot
id. at 471, the statement was inadmissible because the prosecution failed to satisfy its burden
of proving a waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights. Id.
16 Stone, supra note 6, at 100.
17 In Edwards v. Arizona, 100 S. Ct. 1880 (1981), a case decided on the same day as Smith,
the Court ruled that a defendant's statement was obtained in violation of Miranda because the
police failed to honor his invocation of his right to have an attorney present at questioning.
Because the analysis applied in Edwards was foreshadowed by the majority and concurring
opinions in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), Edwards' ruling cannot be considered as
unexpected as the Court's application of Miranda in Smith.
18 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
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and killed a grocery store clerk.' 9 The state of Texas announced its in-
tention to seek the death penalty.20 Thereafter, the trial judge infor-
mally, and, apparently without notice to the defense attorney,2 ' ordered
the prosecuting attorney to arrange a psychiatric examination of Smith
by Dr. James P. Grigson in order to determine Smith's competency to
stand trial.22 After interviewing Smith in jail for approximately ninety
minutes, Dr. Grigson filed a report with the court in which he expressed
the opinion that Smith was competent to stand trial.
23
Since Smith was being tried as a capital defendant, Texas law re-
quired that his case be tried in a bifurcated proceeding which includes a
guilt phase and a penalty phase. If the jury finds the defendant guilty of
a capital offense,24 a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted before
the same jury. At the penalty phase, if the jury affirmatively answers
three questions relating to issues which the State has the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge must impose the death penalty.25
One of the three critical questions the jury must determine is "whether
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
26
Smith was convicted of murder, a capital offense.2 7 At the begin-
ning of the sentencing hearing, the State rested, subject to the right to
reopen. The defense then called three lay witnesses: two relatives who
testified to his good reputation and character, and the owner of a gun
possessed by Smith during the robbery who testified as to Smith's
knowledge that the gun would not fire because of a mechanical defect.
28
The State then called Dr. Grigson as a rebuttal witness.
Prior to trial, Smith's counsel had obtained an order requiring the
State to disclose the witnesses it planned to use both at the guilt stage
and, if known, at the penalty phase,2 9 Subsequently, the trial court
granted a defense motion to bar the testimony, during the state's case-
19 Id. at 1870.
20 Id. at 1868.
21 Id. at 1870, 1871 n.5, 1877 n.15.
22 Id. at 1870. In fact, defendant never challenged his competency to stand trial. Id. at
1870 n.1.
23 Under Texas law, the crime of murder in the course of committing a robbery is a
capital offense. Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03(a)(2), (b) (Vernon 1974).
24 TEx. GRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
25 Id.
26 101 S. Ct. at 1871. As Professor Black has observed, the implications of this question
are troubling because "[t]he concept of the existence of a 'probability' 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' is and can only be puzzling-even mind-boggling--to a jury or to anybody." Black,
Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1976).
27 101 S. Ct. at 1870.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1871.
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in-chief, of any witness whose name did not appear on that list.30 Dr.
Grigson's name was never placed on the witness list.31 Despite defense
counsel's objection that they had not received notice of the possibility of
Dr. Grigson's testimony, the judge permitted the psychiatrist to present
expert testimony on the issue of Smith's future dangerousness. 32
Dr. Grigson's testimony on this issue was striking and devastating.
On the basis of his ninety minute examination, he offered a positive
expert opinion that Smith was "a very severe sociopath," that "he [was]
going to go ahead and commit other similar or same criminal acts if
given the opportunity to do so," that there is no treatment or medicine
which "in any way at all modifies or changes this behavior," and that
his sociopathic condition "will only get worse."' 33 Cross-examination of
Dr. Grigson was not beneficial to the defendant; on the contrary, in the
course of supporting his conclusion that Smith had "no remorse or sor-
row for what he has done," Dr. Grigson was able to testify to and place
his own interpretation upon a particularly incriminating statement al-
legedly made by Smith during the course of the psychiatric interview. 34
The jury answered the three questions submitted to them in the
affirmative, and, as required by law, the judge imposed the death pen-
alty. In the Texas courts, the only challenge to Dr. Grigson's testimony
was that his name had not been listed as a witness in compliance with
the defendant's motion to list all of the State's witnesses to be used in its
case-in-chief. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that there was no viola-
tion because Dr. Grigson testified as a rebuttal witness at the penalty
trial and thus did not come within the terms of defendant's motion.35
The death penalty imposed by the lower court was affirmed.36
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1870.
32 Id. at 1871.
33 Id.
34 Id. In response to the question "[w]hat ...was the most important thing that ...
caused you to think that [Smith] . . .is a severe sociopath," Dr. Grigson testified as follows:
"He told me that this man named Moon looked as though he was going to reach for a gun,
and he pointed his gun toward Mr. Moon's head, pulled the trigger, and it clicked-misfired,
at which time he hollered at Howie, apparently his other partner there who had a gun,
'Watch out, Howie. He's got a gun.' Or something of that sort. At which point he told me-
now I don't know who shot this man, but he told me that Howie shot him, but then he
walked around over this man who had been shot-didn't. . . check to see if he had a gun nor
did he check to see if the man was alive or dead. Didn't call an ambulance, but simply found
the gun further up underneath the counter and took the gun and the money. This is a very-
sort of cold-blooded disregard for another human being's life. I think that his telling me this
story and not saying, you know, 'Man, I would do anything to have that man back alive. I
wish I hadn't just stepped over the body.' Or you know, 'I wish I had checked to see if he was
all right' would indicate a concern, guilt, or remorse. But I didn't get any of this." Id. at 1874
n.9.
35 Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. 1976).
36 Id. at 700.
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Defendant raised several additional challenges to Dr. Grigson's tes-
timony in its motion for a writ of habeas corpus.37 After full considera-
tion of the State court record, the federal district court held that the
use of Dr. Grigson's testimony without proper notice to defense counsel
violated Smith's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to the effective
assistance of counsel as well as his eighth amendment right to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial,38 and that the procurement of
Dr. Grigson's testimony (through the psychiatric examination) was in
violation of Smith's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.39 In affirming the issuance of the writ, the Fifth Circuit agreed
that both the use and the procurement of Dr. Grigson's testimony was
unconstitutional.40 The court found that the State's failure to provide
adequate notice to the defense of Dr. Grigson's testimony was in viola-
tion of the disclosure principles suggested by the Supreme Court in Gard-
ner v. Florida,41 a case which was predicated upon interpretations of both
the due process clause and the eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment clause.42 With respect to the procurement of Dr. Grigson's
testimony, the Fifth Circuit went further than the district court, holding
that under the circumstances the introduction of Dr. Grigson's testi-
mony at the penalty trial was in violation of both Smith's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination 43 and his sixth amendment
right to an attorney.44
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme
Court affirmed 45 the appellate decision. However, despite the lower
court's extensive consideration of a narrower ground for decision,46 the
Court addressed the fifth amendment claim on the merits and resolved
it in the defendant's favor, holding that, under the circumstances in-
volved in Smith, the defendant was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to
the psychiatric examination.47 In additidn, as an independent ground
of decision, the six member majority also decided the sixth amendment
37 Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
38 Id. at 658-61.
39 Id. at 661-64.
40 Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
41 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
42 Id. at 362 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
43 602 F.2d at 708-09.
44 Id. at 709.
45 Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
46 The Court could have affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision on due process-eighth amend-
ment grounds, holding that the government violated the principle articulated in Gardner when
it failed to disclose to defendant the fact that Dr. Grigsby was going to testify as a witness
against him. In addition, the majority could have joined the concurring opinions in deciding
the case on sixth amendment grounds without reaching the fifth amendment issue.
47 101 S. Ct. at 1875-76.
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issue in the defendant's favor.48 In two separate opinions, the three re-
maining justices concurred on sixth amendment grounds without reach-
ing the fifth amendment issue.4 9
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT-
MIRANDA ANALYSIS
The majority began their analysis of the fifth amendment issue by
focusing upon whether the fifth amendment privilege is applicable in
the context presented in Smith. The State argued that the privilege was
inapplicable for two reasons: first, the privilege should not apply when
the evidence in question is being used only to determine punishment
after conviction and not to establish guilt;50 and second, the privilege
should not apply to the psychiatric evidence presented in Smith because
the defendant's communications to Dr. Grigson were non-testimonial. 51
In rejecting the state's first argument, the Court did not state that
the fifth amendment privilege will apply to all statements obtained from
a defendant for the purpose of determining his penalty.5 2 Instead, the
majority focused upon the fact that the particular penalty involved in
Smith was the "ultimate penalty of death. '53 Drawing upon other deci-
sions imposing strict procedural protections where the death penalty is
at issue,54 the Court stated that in view of "the gravity of the decision to
be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation
to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees.- 55 Thus, the Court's
holding that the fifth amendment privilege was applicable at the pen-
alty stage of the proceedings appears to be predicated upon the fact that
the death penalty is at issue in those proceedings. This analysis suggests
not only that the death penalty is of a different magnitude than other
punishments, but also that one should view the death penalty determi-
48 Id. at 1877.
49 Id. at 1879 (Stewart, J., concurring) (joined by Powell, J.); id. at 1879 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). Justice Rehnquist could be viewed as dissenting from the majority's analysis of
the fifth amendment issue. After stating that he would not "consider the Fifth Amendment
issues and cannot subscribe to the Court's resolution of them," id. at 1879 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring), he went on to consider the possible application of Miranda and concluded that,
"Particularly since it is not necessary to decide this case, I would not extend the Miranda
requirements to cover psychiatric examinations such as the one involved here." Id. at 1879-80
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 1872.
51 Id. at 1873.
52 Lower courts have generally held that the privilege is not applicable to statements ob-
tained from defendants for noncapital sentencing. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285,
265 N.W.2d 540 (1978).
53 101 S. Ct. at 1873.
54 The Court cited Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14
(1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 101 S. Ct. at 1873.
55 101 S. Ct. at 1873.
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nation as a separate stage of the adversary process--one in which the
issue at stake is quite distinct from that involved in the guilt phase of the
trial.56
The majority also rejected the State's claim that statements made
by Smith to Dr. Grigson during the psychiatric interview were non-testi-
monial.57 The Chief Justice found that the issue in Smith was not analo-
gous to that in cases involving voice exemplars, 58 handwriting
exemplars,5 9 lineups, 60 or blood samples6' because Dr. Grigson's diagno-
sis was not based simply upon his observations of Smith, but rather was
premised in large part upon "statements [Smith] made, and remarks he
omitted, '62 during the course of the psychiatric interview. Thus, the
Court found the fifth amendment privilege to be applicable "because
the State used as evidence against [Smith] the substance of his disclo-
sures during the pretrial psychiatric examination."63
56 The same point is also suggested by the Court's earlier statement that "[j]ust as the
Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made 'the deluded instrument of
his own conviction,' Culombe v. Connecticut, [367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961)]. . .quoting 2 Haw-
kins Pleas of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824), it protects him as well from being made the
'deluded instrument' of his own execution." 101 S. Ct. at 1873.
Moreover, in Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981) the Court explicitly articu-
lates this same point and makes it the central tenet of its analysis. In Bullinglon, the defendant
was twice tried under Missouri's bifurcated capital sentencing procedure. At the first trial,
defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After this
conviction was reversed, defendant was subjected to a second trial in which the jury not only
again convicted him of capital murder but also imposed a sentence of death. In holding that
this death penalty was imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment, the Court reasoned that, under the procedure employed by the state, the penalty phase
of the proceedings "resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately
preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of punish-
ment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes." Id. at 1858. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that "[b]ecause the sentencing proceeding at [defendant's] .. .first trial was like
the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available to him, with respect to the death
penalty, at his retrial." Id. at 1862.
57 101 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
58 In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court held that the compelled
production of voice exemplars would not violate the fifth amendment privilege, since the
exemplars were to be used only for identification purposes, and not for their communicative
content.
59 In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court concluded that a handwriting
exemplar, not offered for the content of what is written, is an identifying physical characteris-
tic outside the protection of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
60 In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) the Court held that line-ups are non-
testimonial and thus not within the protection of the fifth amendment privilege.
61 In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) the Court found that extraction
and chemical analysis of a blood sample from defendant involved no "shadow of testimonial
compulsion."
62 101 S. Ct. at 1873.
63 Id. at 1874. Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that it was not holding that
the fifth amendment privilege was applicable to all psychiatric examinations. The majority
1981] 1529
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Having determined that the fifth amendment applied, the Court
went on to conclude that the defendant was entitled to Miranda warn-
ings prior to the psychiatric examination. In view of its prior holdings,
the Court's analysis was striking.
Given the Court's recent treatment of Miranda, there would appear
to be strong arguments against applying Mranda to a psychiatric inter-
view, especially one conducted for the purpose of determining compe-
tency to stand trial. The underlying premise of the Miranda decision was
that, because of the atmosphere at the police station and the tactics em-
ployed by police interrogators there, police interrogation of an individ-
ual in custody is inherently coercive.64 Based on that premise, the Court
concluded that warnings to the individual are necessary to insure that
statements obtained from him are a product of his free choice,65 or, in
other words, not compelled from him in violation of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. Thus, to apply Miranda to the present situation, it would
appear to be necessary to show that the coercive atmosphere present in a
psychiatric examination of a defendant in custody is the same or similar
to the inherently coercive atmosphere which Miranda found to be pres-
ent in a custodial police interrogation.
On the basis of empirical evidence, one can certainly argue that
psychiatric interviews are sufficiently analogous to police interrogations
to be considered inherently coercive within the meaning of Miranda.66
specifically stated that if the state had used the statements made to Dr. Grigson merely for the
purpose of determining defendant's competency to stand trial, no fifth amendment issue
would have arisen. Id. In addition, the majority intimated that a different issue would have
been presented if testimony based on a defendant's statements made in the course of a psychi-
atric examination were introduced to rebut psychiatric testimony offered by the defendant for
the purpose of establishing a defense of insanity. Id. In a footnote, the Court added that the
court of appeals left open " 'the possibility that a defendant who wishes to use psychiatric
evidence in his own behalf [on the issue of future dangerousness] can be precluded from using
it unless he is [also] willing to be examined by a psychiatrist nominated by the state.' " Id. at
1874 n.10 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 707 (5th Cir. 1979)). And, finally, in
another footnote, the majority indicated that it was not holding that the fifth amendment
would apply to "all types of interviews and examinations that might be ordered or relied
upon to inform a sentencing determination." 101 S. Ct. at 1876 n.13.
64 101 S. Ct. at 1875.
65 See 384 U.S. at 467: "[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interroga-
tion of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely."
66 E.g. , Aronson, Should the Privdege Against Sef-Incrzmination Apply to Compelled Pychiatric
Examinations? 26 STAN. L. REV. 55, 65-66 (1973). Professor Aronson argued that the atmos-
phere at a psychiatric examination is no less coercive than at a police interrogation. He noted
that psychiatrists are trained to elicit material which subjects seek to hide and sometimes are
not averse to using tricks and compulsion to achieve this end. Moreover, he pointed out that
a defendant subjected to a psychiatric examination will generally be isolated from family,
friends, and attorney, and that the psychiatrist may use a series of interviews in order to break
down the defendant's resistance to questioning. For other articles considering the application
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However, as noted previously,67 prior to the Smith case, the Burger
Court had evidenced an extreme reluctance to apply Miranda to new
situations. For example, in United States v. Mandujano68 four members of
the Court in a plurality opinion by Chief Justice Burger maintained
that a "putative" defendant appearing before the grand jury was not
entitled to Miranda warnings.69 In distinguishing this situation from the
custodial police interrogation at issue in Miranda, the plurality read Mi-
randa as focusing upon a particular type of coercive setting, one which
"was seen by the Court as police 'coercion' derived from 'factual studies
[relating to] police violence and the 'third degree' . . physical brutal-
ity-beating, hanging, whipping-and to sustained and protracted
questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions.' ",70 Because
the environment confronting a grand jury witness is obviously different,
the plurality refused to extend Miranda to this situation.71
On other occasions, the Court as a whole has evidenced a similar
disposition to confine Miranda to the type of custodial interrogation
which was particularly involved in the situations before the Court in
that case. 72 The Court's per curiam decision in Oregon v. Mathiason73 is
particularly noteworthy.74 In Mathiason the defendant was on parole
when he was contacted by a police officer investigating a burglary. In
response to a note left at his apartment by the officer, defendant phoned
the officer and agreed to meet with him later that afternoon at the State
of the fifth amendment privilege to psychiatric exams, see: Danforth, Death Knellfor Pre-Trial
Mental Examination? Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 489 (1965);
LeFelt, Pretrial MentalExaminations." Compelled Cooperation andthe Fih Amendment, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 431 (1972); Comment, Compulso,7 Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-
incrimination, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 671; Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a ovem-
ment Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege against Self-incrimination, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 648 (1970); Note, Mental Examinations of Defendants Who Plead Insaniy; Problems of Sef-
incrimination, 40 TEMP. L. Q. 366 (1967).
67 See notes 9-10 & accompanying text supra.
68 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
69 Id. at 578-80 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). A unanimous Court held that the
particular defendant in Mandujano was not entitled to relief in any event because that defend-
ant was convicted of committing perjury before the grand jury, and the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination does not sanction perjury. For a thorough analysis of the issues
involved in Mandujano, see Stone, supra note 6, at 154-64.
70 425 U.S. at 580.
71 Id.
72 The Miranda decision involved four separate cases. In each of these cases, "law enforce-
ment officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the
purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to
remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney." 384 U.S. at 440.
73 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
74 See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that Miranda not ap-
plicable to situation where defendant questioned in a private home by I.R.S. agents who were
investigating defendant's possible involvement in criminal tax fraud).
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Patrol Office. 75 The officer met defendant in the hallway, took him into
his office and closed the door. Without advising him of his Miranda
rights, the officer told the defendant that the police believed he was in-
volved in the burglary, and falsely stated that his fingerprints had been
found at the scene. 76 After some further discussion, defendant con-
fessed. 77 The Oregon Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were
required because the "interrogation took place in a 'coercive environ-
ment'. "78 The Supreme Court, however, reversed. Based upon the par-
ticular facts involved, 79 the per curiam majority held that at the time of
his confession, defendant was not "in custody 'or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.'"80 Having found that
Miranda was not directly applicable, the Court was emphatic in refusing
to consider the possibility of extending Miranda to an analogous form of
coercive environment.81 After reiterating that Miranda was concerned
with custodial interrogation, the Court declared that "[i]t was that sort
of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made appli-
cable, and to which it is limited. 82
Based on these authorities, it would appear that before the Court
would apply Miranda to the psychiatric examination involved in Smith it
would have to conclude that the potential for coercion in that setting is
equivalent (or, perhaps, exactly the same) as that involved when a de-
fendant in custody is subjected to interrogation by the police. However,
the Court never specifically addressed this issue.83 Instead, it summarily
concluded that "[t]he considerations calling for the accused to be
warned prior to custodial interrogation apply with no less force to the
pretrial psychiatric examination at issue here."'84 In equating the psy-
chiatric examination with custodial police interrogation, the Court did
not focus upon the potentially coercive atmosphere involved, but rather
upon the defendant's lack of awareness of the incriminatory dangers:
During the psychiatric evaluation, [defendant] assuredly was "faced with a
phase of the adversary system" and was "not in the presence of [a] person
75 429 U.S. at 493.
76 Id.
7 7 Id.
78 275 Ore. 1, 5, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (1976), rev'g, 22 Ore. App. 494, 539 P.2d 1122 (1975).
79 The Court emphasized that the defendant "came voluntarily to the police station,"
that "he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest," and that, after confessing,
he "did in fact leave the police station without hindrance." 429 U.S. at 495. For a critical
view of the Court's analysis of these facts, see Stone, supra note 6, at 153-54.
80 429 U.S. at 495 (quoting 384 U.S. at 444).
81 For an analysis of this aspect of the Court's opinion, see Stone, supra note 6, at 154.
82 429 U.S. at 495.
83 The point was raised, however, by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion. 101
U.S. at 1879 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 1875.
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acting solely in his interest." . . . Yet he was given no indication that the
compulsory examination would be used to gather evidence necessary to
decide whether, if convicted, he should be sentenced to death. He was not
informed that, accordingly, he had a constitutional right not to answer the
questions put to him.8 5
Thus, in the custodial setting,86 the government psychiatrist's failure to
inform the defendant as to the stakes involved in the interview was
enough to trigger a violation of Miranda.
The shift from evaluating the coercive potential of the particular
context in which the defendant is questioned to focusing upon the de-
fendant's awareness of the incriminatory potential of his responses obvi-
ously will reach beyond the context of the Smith case. The Court
unambiguously spelled out one potential reach of the decision when it
stated: "That [defendant] was questioned by a psychiatrist designated
by the trial court to conduct a neutral competency examination, rather
than by a police officer, government informant, prosecuting attorney is
immaterial. '8 7 This statement, which is entirely consistent with the rest
of the Court's analysis, seems to indicate that Miranda's requirements
will apply when any agent of the government seeks to question a defend-
ant in custody. If this reading of Smith is correct, one important practi-
cal consequence is that this will effectively bar the government from
using undercover agents to obtain incriminating statements from de-
fendants who are arrested and in custody but not yet arraigned.88 As
Professor Kamisar has vividly demonstrated,8 9 there is a strong argu-
ment against concluding that questioning of a defendant by a 'jail-
plant" government agent is inherently coercive within the meaning of
Miranda.9O Nevertheless, based on Smith's analysis, a government "jail-
85 Id.
86 By emphasizing the fact that defendant was in custody, id., the Court indicated that
Smith's holding could be confined to that context and would not necessarily apply to a situa-
tion in which a defendant on bail was interviewed by a government agent.
87 Id.
88 Smith's holding, of course, does not go this far. There is no reason to suppose that the
defendant in Smith viewed the examining psychiatrist as anything other than a government
psychiatrist. Thus, based on its holding, the Court's language pertaining to government
agents could be read to include only people known by the defendant to be government
agents. However, the majority provided no indication that its language should be read in this
strained fashion.
89 ESSAYS IN LAW, supra note 6, at 188-201.
90 [E]ven though a person is in custody, "surreptitious interrogation" is insufficient to
bring Miranda into play. For unless a person realizes he is dealing with the police, their
efforts to elicit incriminating statements from him do not constitute "police interroga-
tion" within the meaning of Mianda .. .It is the impact on the suspect's mind of the
ihterplay between police interrogation and police custody--each condition reinforcing the
pressures and anxieties produced by the other-that, as the Miranda Court correctly dis-
cerned, makes "custodial police interrogation" so devastating. . .In the "jail plant" or
other "undercover" situations, however, there is no 'ntegralion of "custody" and "interro-




plant" who was seeking to obtain incriminating information from a de-
fendant in custody but not yet arraigned, 91 would be required to give
the defendant some form of meaningful Miranda warnings92 before he
would be allowed to ask him questions about his offense or engage in
any speech or conduct which would constitute "interrogation" within
the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innisr.93
In line with the shift towards assuring that the defendant be aware
that he is being confronted with a phase of the adversary process, the
Court's discussion of the actual warnings required is extremely interest-
ing. Although the majority clearly held that Dr. Grigson was required
to warn defendant in order to render the results of the psychiatric exam
admissible in the penalty proceeding, it did not specify the precise na-
ture of the warnings required. Significantly, the Court never stated that
merely giving the defendant the warnings required by Miranda would
suffice. On the contrary, in its apparent articulation of a holding on the
fifth amendment issue, the Court implied that the familiar warnings
would not be enough: "Because [defendant] did not voluntarily consent
to the pretrial psychiatric examination after being informed of his right
to remain silent and the possible use of his statements, the State could not
rely on what he said to Dr. Grigson to establish his future dangerous-
ness." 94 What warning would be sufficient to alert the defendant as to
"the possible use of his statements?" Earlier in its opinion, the Court
appeared to speak directly to this issue when it stated that the defendant
"was given no indication that the compulsory examination would be
used to gather evidence necessary to decide whether, if convicted, he
Id. at 195-96.
91 Once the defendant is arraigned, his sixth amendment right to an attorney comes into
effect. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688
(1972). The Court has held that, once the sixth amendment right attaches, defendants in
custody are protected from a "jail plant's" attempt to deliberately elicit incriminating state-
ments. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45
(1967), rev'g, 377 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1967).
92 In Smith the Court did not delineate the precise form of Miranda warnings required.
Based on the Court's analysis, at least one of the warnings would not be applicable in the
context presented in Smith. The Court strongly intimated that the defendant would not have
the right to have an attorney present during the psychiatric examination. 101 U.S. at 1877
n.14. Therefore, the government would not have to warn the defendant of his right to have
an attorne present during the government's examination.
93 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Miranda only prohibits "custodial interrogation." 384 U.S. at 478-
79. In Rhode Islandv. Innis, the Court defined interrogation as including not only direct ques-
tioning but also tactics "that the police should know [are] . . .reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect." 446 U.S. at 301. Whether an undercover agent
would be required to give a suspect Miranda warnings before engaging him in conversation
would depend upon whether the agent's conversation would constitute interrogation within
the meaning of Innis. For a prediction as to the probable meaning of the Innis test, see White,
supra note 12, at 1224-36.
94 101 S. Ct. at 1876 (emphasis added).
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should be sentenced to death. '95 This certainly implies that, at least in
the context of a case like Smith, a simple warning to the defendant that
"anything you say can be used against you" would be insufficient. In-
stead, the defendant would have to be specifically warned that, if he
were convicted of a capital offense, the jury in a penalty proceeding
could use statements made by him in the psychiatric examination to
decide whether to sentence him to death.
Of course, the implications of this aspect of the Smith opinion are
not clear. The reference to a death penalty warning requirement is not
essential to the Court's holding.96 In the context of Smith, one could
read Chief Justice Burger's reference to the warning as simply identify-
ing one means by which the defendant could be enlightened as to the
possible use which might be made of his disclosures to the psychiatrist. 97
Under this narrow reading of the majority's language, a death penalty
warning would not be required so long as the defendant was otherwise
alerted as to the incriminatory potential of his disclosures to the govern-
ment agent.98 Thus, in cases where the defendant had notice that the
psychiatrist or other government agent would possibly testify for the
government at the penalty phase of the proceedings, no specific warning
that statements made by the defendant could be used to decide
"whether, if convicted, he should be sentenced to death," would be re-
quired. And in cases where the psychiatrist or other government agent
was merely going to testify against the defendant at his capital trial, no
death penalty warning of any kind would be mandated.
This narrow interpretation of Smith, however, runs against two cen-
tral threads of the Court's analysis. As has already been noted,99 Smith
effected an important change in the Miranda doctrine in that it shifted
the focus away from the question of whether the particular environment
confronting the defendant was inherently coercive and towards the issue
95 Id. at 1875.
96 Prior to the psychiatric exam, no warnings whatsoever were given to the defendant in
Smith. Thus, the Court's holding that basic Miranda warnings were required (including the
warning of the right to remain silent, id. at 1875) was sufficient to dispose of the particular
case before it.
97 Under the circumstances of Smith's case, Dr. Grigson's testimony was not admissible at
the guilt stage of the proceedings, and Smith would have no reason to think otherwise.
Therefore, in order to enlighten the defendant as to the incriminatory potential of his disclo-
sures to the psychiatrist, it would be necessary to explain the possible relationship between his
disclosures and the issue at stake in the penalty proceeding. Obviously, the clearest means of
explaining this relationship would be to tell the defendant that statements made by him to
Dr. Grigson could be used by the jury to decide whether to sentence him to death.
98 However, in view of the Court's analysis, it would be questionable whether the defend-
ant could be adequately informed as to the incriminatory potential of his statements unless he
were made aware of the possible relationship between the statements and the imposition of
the death penalty. Se text accompanying notes 107-09 infia.
99 See text accompanying notes 83-85 sup ra.
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of whether the defendant was made adequately aware of the adversary
interests at stake. In addition, Smith was consistent with the Court's
other recent death penalty decisions in that it emphasized the unique
character of the punishment of death. The Court made it clear that the
adversary consequences involved at the penalty phase are not only of a
greater magnitude than those involved in any non-capital sentencing
determination, but are also distinct from the adversary consequences in-
volved at the guilt phase of the trial. 100
Both of these principles bear upon the doctrine of waiver. In Mi-
randa itself the Court stated that in order to establish a valid waiver the
government must satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating that "the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination."10 1 Subsequent decisions, especially the Court's analysis
in United States v. Washington,102 suggested that the Court might no
longer be willing to apply this strict doctrine of waiver in the Miranda
context. 103 Smith's shift in focus revitalizes the doctrine, however, by
making it clear that, at least in certain contexts, a warning which en-
lightens the defendant as to the nature of the adversary interests at stake
will be indispensable to a valid waiver of Miranda rights.
Of course, one need not read Smith as holding that a warning as to
the precise nature of the adversary interests involved is indispensable to
a valid waiver under Miranda in all cases.10 4 The Court's emphasis upon
the unique nature of the adversary interests involved at the death pen-
100 See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
101 384 U.S. at 475.
102 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
103 The issue before the Court in Washington was whether a grand jury witness who was
viewed by the government as a potential defendant was entitled to a warning that his testi-
mony could lead to an indictment. The essence of the defendant's argument was, that, in the
absence of such a warning, any waiver of his fifth amendment privilege would be unintelli-
gent because there would be no basis for a conclusion that he was aware of the potential
consequences of such waiver, 431 U.S. at 188-89. However, the Court branded this argument
"largely irrelevant," id. at 189, because the real question for fifth amendment purposes was
whether the defendant was compelled to give testimony and his ignorance as to whether he
was a potential defendant could have no bearing on that issue. Id. at 189-90. Thus, in this
context, the Court appeared to disregard Miranda's requirement that a defendant's waiver of
his fifth amendment privilege be knowing and intelligent. For an analysis of the Washington
case see Stone, supra note 6, at 164-66.
104 Nothing in Smith is inconsistent with the lower court decisions holding that the interro-
gating officer need not inform the suspect of the specific nature of non-capital charges in-
volved in order to obtain a valid waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210,
1212 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877
(1974). In most non-capital cases, it is not unreasonable to assume that the circumstances of
the defendant's arrest will provide him with notice as to at least the general nature of the
adversary interets at stake. When this is not the case, a different analysis has been applied by
some lower courts. See cases cited in note 109 inra.
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alty hearing'0 5 does suggest, however, that a differentiation must be
made between a defendant's knowledge that the prosecution may use his
statement against him to secure the death penalty and his knowledge
that the prosecution may use it against him for any other purposes. If
the defendant's statement is to be used against him in the penalty phase
of a capital trial, then knowledge that the statement may be used for
this purpose should be essential to a valid waiver under Miranda. A cap-
ital defendant who lacks such knowledge will not be aware of the true
nature of the adversary interests involved.
This analysis does not in itself prove that a capital defendant
should necessarily be entitled to a death penalty warning. Assuming
that a capital defendant's awareness of the nature of the adversary inter-
ests at stake is indispensable to a valid waiver, it does not follow that the
defendant must be specifically informed as to the nature of those inter-
ests. An alternative approach would be to require that the defendant's
awareness of the nature of the adversary interests at stake be litigated on
a case-by-case basis. On this point, Smith's reference to the fact that the
defendant was not given a death penalty warning is perhaps signifi-
cant. 10 6 Since the court could have simply stated that there was no basis
for concluding that the defendant in Smith would be aware that his
statement might be used against him at his penalty trial, the majority's
choice of language suggests that, in this particular context, it may be
inclined to eschew a case-by-case approach, opting instead for the impo-
sition of a warning requirement.
If one can properly read Smith's language in this way, the Court's
judgment seems wise. Litigating a'defendant's knowledge is difficult in
any situation. In the present context, litigating this issue would appear
to be particularly unproductive because in most cases the only evidence
which would likely bear significantly upon the relevant issue would be
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest, including any-
thing that the officers might have said to him at that time. But, unless
the defendant was alerted in some way to the fact that he was charged
with a capital offense, it is unlikely that his knowledge as to the potential
use of his statement could be inferred from the circumstances of his ar-
rest. Given the complexity of capital punishment legislation 10 7 as well
105 See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
106 More precisely, the Court referred to the fact that the defendant was "given no indica-
tion" that the statements made by him to the psychiatrist might be used to secure his execu-
tion. 101 S. Ct. at 1875. While this language refers to some kind of a death penalty warning,
it does not suggest that the warning must be given in any particular form of words. Cf.
California v. Prysock, 101 S. Ct. 2806 (1981) (holding content of Miranda warnings need not
follow verbatim the statement of warnings contained in the Miranda opinion).
107 The constitutional requirements pertaining to capital punishment legislation have been
adumbrated by the Court in a series of cases. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
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as the rarity with which the death penalty is actually imposed, 0 8 it is
not appropriate to conclude that defendants charged with capital of-
fenses are cognizant of the possibility of a death sentence when they are
not so informed by the government. 10 9 Therefore, one should not dis-
miss Smith's reference to a death penalty warning requirement as sur-
plusage. At least when the government seeks to obtain statements from
a custodial defendant for use in penalty proceedings at which the impo-
sition of the death penalty will be a possibility, requiring such a warning
as a prerequisite to the statement's admissibility is entirely consistent
with the premises which undergird Smith's analysis.
The case in which the government agent is seeking to obtain a de-
fendant's statement for use in the guilt stage of a capital trial is some-
what more problematic. In this situation, one might argue that the
defendant's statement is being introduced merely to establish guilt; and,
therefore, even if a special death penalty warning is applicable in cases
where a defendant's statement is going to be used against him at the
penalty stage, it is not applicable in this situation. However, this argu-
ment is too formalistic; it does not take into account the underlying pur-
pose of the death penalty warning. The additional warning is needed
when it is necessary to make the defendant aware of the true character
of the adversary interests at stake-that is, to inform him that he is con-
fronted with, not merely a stage of the adversary process, but a stage at
which his words could lead to his own execution.1 10 The defendant's
need for this information is equally present whether his statement is to
be introduced against him at the guilt or penalty phase of a capital trial.
In both cases, his words may lead to his execution. Indeed, if the prose-
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See
generally, Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1980); Liebman & Shepard, Guiding
Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate'" Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66
GEO. L. J. 757 (1978).
108 For example, during the year 1980, 187 defendants were sentenced to death. Bureau of
Justice Statistics Bulletin, Capital Punishment 1980, at 1. While this figure is large in com-
parison to the number of people sentenced to death in previous recent years, it is obviously
small when compared to the total number of defendants charged and convicted of murder in
1980.
109 Cf. United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating in dicta that a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver is not possible where the suspect is ignorant of the
nature of the offense about which he is being interrogated); Schenk v. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp.
26 (D. Mont. 1968) (defendant's sixth amendment waiver held invalid on ground that he was
not given sufficient information to indicate that he was suspected of murder); Commonwealth
v. Dixon, 475 Pa. 17, 379 A.2d 553 (1977) (holding that a valid waiver of Miranda rights
requires that the suspect have an awareness of the general nature of the transaction giving rise
to the investigation; where interrogating officials did not affirmatively provide suspect with
such information, the Commonwealth was required to prove by a prepronderance of the evi-
dence that defendant knew of the occasion for the interrogation).
110 See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
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cution introduces the defendant's statement at the guilt phase and the
jury convicts the defendant of a capital offense, the jury will in fact con-
sider the defendant's statement at the penalty phase. The same jury
deliberates at both the guilt and penalty phase; and in deciding the pen-
alty issue, that jury will inevitably and quite properly consider any of
the evidence admitted at the guilt stage which bears upon the relevant
issues at stake in the penalty stage.
Moreover, with respect to securing a capital defendant's constitu-
tional protections, the Court has already virtually obliterated any dis-
tinction between the guilt and penalty phase of a capital trial. In
reiterating that stricter procedural requirements must be met in capital
trials than in ordinary cases, the Court in Beck v. Alabama "' unambigu-
ously stated 12 and implicitly held that the same high standard of scru-
tiny applies whether the procedure involved relates to the guilt or
penalty determination. 1 3 It should follow that if a capital defendant is
entitled to the special protection afforded by a warning relating to the
potential use of his incriminating statements at the penalty phase of his
capital trial, then the same protection should be provided to a capital
defendant who is confronted with the possibility of being incriminated
by his own statements at the guilt phase of the trial. Therefore, at least
as to cases in which the death penalty is actually imposed, the death
penalty warning requirement should apply to statements which are ob-
tained for use against defendants at the guilt stage of their capital
trials. 114
III. SMITH'S SIXTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
The Court also concluded, as an independent basis for its decision,
that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated.
The Court's brief discussion of the sixth amendment issue was cryptic
but potentially significant.
In placing its decision on sixth amendment grounds, the Court reaf-
111 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980).
112 Id. at 2389-90.
113 In Beck, the Court held that a statutory procedure precluding jury consideration of a
lesser-included non-capital offense in a capital case was constitutionally impermissible.
Stressing the significant difference between the death penalty and all other punishments, the
Court indicated that it was not deciding that due process would require jury charges on
lesser-included offenses in non-capital cases. Id. at 2389-90 n.14.
114 The purpose of the warning is to alert the capital defendant to the possibility that his
words may be used against him to secure a death sentence. In capital cases where no death
penalty is ultimately imposed, the defendant's words have not in fact been used against him
for this purpose. Therefore, the admission of a statement obtained in the absence of a death
penalty should constitute reversible error only in those cases in which the defendant is actu-
ally sentenced to death.
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firmed the principle that the defendant's sixth amendment right to an
attorney provides the defendant with different and broader protection
than Miranda's guarantee of a right to have counsel present at a govern-
ment interrogation. 1 5 The Court indicated that the defendant's sixth
amendment right was applicable in Smith because adversary proceed-
ings against the defendant had commenced1 16 and because Dr. Grig-
son's examination of the defendant "proved to be" a critical stage of the
proceedings.1 17 The majority then proceeded to explain why defend-
ant's sixth amendment right was violated.
Defense counsel, however, were not notified in advance that the psy-
chiatric examination would encompass the issue of their client's future
dangerousness, and [defendant] was denied the assistance of his attorneys
in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination
and to what end the psychiatrist's findings could be employed.
18
This language appears to alter the scope of the sixth amendment
right in two respects. First, it redefines the nature of the right to an
attorney. For at least the past decade, the sixth amendment right to an
attorney at pretrial proceedings was generally taken to mean the right to
have an attorney present at those proceedings. 119 The sixth amendment
right recognized in Smith, however, was the defendant's right to the
assistance of an attorney in making the decision as to whether he will
submit to the pretrial proceedings-in that case, a psychiatric exam. 120
Because the Court emphasized that the defendant needed the attorney's
advice in order to decide whether to invoke his fifth amendment privi-
lege, 12' it is logical to interpret Smith as providing defendants with the
right to counsel's assistance in decision-making whenever the sixth
amendment right applies in a context where the defendant's invocation
115 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272-73 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980). See general'y ESSAYS IN LAW, supra note 6, at 139-244.
116 In fact the defendant had already been indicted. 101 S. Ct. at 1870.
117 Id. at 1877.
118 Id.
t 19 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). However, in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964) the Court did specify that the defendant's sixth amendment
right was violated because he was "denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer." How-
ever, Escobedo's sixth amendment analysis was soon obliterated by the Court's decision in
Miranda. See generally ESSAYS IN LAW, supra note 6, at 162.
120 The Court also suggested that the defendant's attorney does not have the right to be
present at the psychiatric examination itself. 101 S. Ct. at 1877 n.14. This point could be
significant in cases as to which the defendant's attorney consents to the psychiatric examina-
tion with the understanding that the evidence derived will be used for a limited purpose. If
the attorney is not allowed to be present at the examination, it will be difficult for defendants
to litigate the question of whether evidence subsequently offered by the prosecution was de-
rived from the examination. To alleviate this problem, a possible approach might be either to
allow the attorney to view the examination (without being allowed to participate) or to re-
quire the government to provide a tape-recording of it.
121 101 S. Ct. at 1877.
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of the fifth amendment privilege is potentially applicable. This reading
of Smith will clarify the meaning of the sixth amendment right in cases
where the government seeks to elicit incriminating statements from de-
fendants by the use of undercover informers.' 22 In these cases the gov-
ernment will not satisfy the defendant's sixth amendment right by
somehow arranging to have the defendant's attorney present at the time
the surreptitious attempt to elicit disclosures takes place.123 Rather, the
defendant's sixth amendment right will entitle him to an attorney's ad-
vice as to whether he should submit to the government attempt to elicit
information. By putting the sixth amendment right on this basis, the
Court insures that the defendant's awareness of the government's efforts
to obtain information and thereby eliminates the possibility that the
government through deception may negate the effect of the sixth
amendment right.
Second, the Court's approach appears to modify the doctrine of
sixth amendment waiver. Although the Court noted that it was not
holding that the defendant was precluded from waiving his sixth
amendment right, 124 the Court's emphasis upon counsel's right to ad-
vance notification 125 seems to mean that, at least in the situation in-
volved in Smith, the government could not circumvent the defendant's
sixth amendment protection by merely informing the defendant as to
his right to an attorney and obtaining a personal waiver of that right
from him; instead, it appears that some consultation between the de-
fendant and his attorney would ordinarily be indispensable to a valid
waiver of the sixth amendment right. 126
122 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.s. 201 (1964).
123 At least two commentators have referred to this possibility. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel
for the Suspect: Massiah a. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 56-57 (1964)
(observing that, although the government impropriety would be the same whether counsel
happened to be present or not, Massiah's sixth amendment rationale obfuscates analysis of
this situation). Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 (1977) (while holding that un-
dercover agent's meeting with defendant and his attorney to discuss defendant's defense to a
criminal charge did not violate defendant's sixth amendment right, the Court noted that a
stronger sixth amendment case would be presented if the undercover agent had testified at
the trial).
124 101 S. Ct. at 1877 n.16.
125 The three justices who declined to join the Court's opinion joined the majority in speci-
fying that the defendant's sixth amendment right was violated because the government failed
to notify defendant's attorney before conducting the psychiatric exam. 101 S. Ct. at 1879
(Stewart, J., concurring) (joined by Powell, J.); id. at 1879-80 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
126 The requirement that the police notify the defendant's attorney obviously means that
the attorney is entitled to play a part in making the waiver decision. Otherwise, the notice
requirement would be meaningless because its effect could be easily defeated by the govern-
ment. An officer could notify the defendant's attorney of a proposed psychiatric exam one
minute before a government psychiatrist, as a preliminary to conducting the exam, sought to
obtain the defendant's personal wavier of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. Therefore,
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If this reading of Smith is correct, then there is some need to recon-
cile this aspect of Smith with the Court's analysis in Brewer v. Williams. 127
In Willams the Court dealt with a situation in which the police ob-
tained incriminating disclosures from a defendant after the defendant
had been arraigned and was represented by counsel. The Court held
that the use of the defendant's incriminating disclosures at trial was in
violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to an attorney. 128
However, the Court emphasized that it was not holding that the defend-
ant "could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments"' 29 but was only holding that no
such waiver took place under the actual facts of Williams.130 Signifi-
cantly, the four dissenting justices found that the defendant did in fact
waive his sixth amendment right;' 3 ' and in a concurring opinion, a fifth
Justice read the Court as explicitly holding that the defendant's sixth
amendment right "may be waived, after it has attached, without notice
to or consultation with counsel. '132
Several possible approaches could be taken in reconciling the con-
flicting principles expounded by the Court in Williams and Smith. The
broadest approach would be to read Smith's doctrine of sixth amend-
ment waiver as replacing the Williams analysis. A broad reading of
Smith would appear consistent with the ethical precept, implicitly ar-
ticulated by the Court in Heny, that the government should not seek to
communicate with a defendant represented by an attorney in the ab-
sence of the attorney's consent.' 3 3 Nevertheless, to disregard Williams'
explicit discussion of the requirements of a sixth amendment waiver
the notification requirement clearly implies that before the government can seek a personal
waiver from the defendant, they must either obtain a waiver from the defendant's attorney or
allow the defendant to consult with the attorney. Barring extraordinary circumstances, no
competent attorney would presume to waive the important constitutional rights involved
without first consulting with his client.
127 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
128 Id. at 406.
129 Id. at 405-06.
130 Id.
131 430 U.S. at 433 (White, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, and Blackmun, Jj.); id. at
417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 413 (Powell, J., concurring).
133 See 100 S.Ct. 2183, 2189 n.14 (quoting ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D.R. 7-104(A)(1) (1978) which prohibits a lawyer from "[c]ommunicat[ing] or caus[ing] an-
other to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be repre-
sented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing
such other party or is authorized by law to do so"). Although the Court stated that the rule
did not "bear on the constitutional issue" involved in Heng, its quotation of the rule would
appear to suggest that, at least when the sixth amendment is applicable, the Court views
actions of all government agents as equivalent to action by the prosecution (that is, the gov-
ernment attorney). Thus, if the disciplinary rule were to apply, the prohibition imposed by
the rule on governent attorneys would apply equally to the police.
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might be somewhat incautious, especially in view of the vehemence with
which the waiver issue was discussed by the various opinions in that
case.
A more limited approach is to distinguish the situations in Smith
and Williams on the basis of the particular facts involved in each case.
Among the various distinctions which one could draw, three seem po-
tentially relevant. First, at the time the government sought to obtain
the information from the defendant, the defendant's attorney was acces-
sible to the government in Smith but was not so in Williams;134 second,
Smith involved a psychiatric examination, whereas Williams involved
police interrogation; 13 and third, Smith, but not Williams,136 was a capi-
tal case in which the evidence obtained by the government was used to
lead to a sentence of death.
The difference of attorney accessibility in Smith and Williams could
lead to a rule which takes into account the feasibility for the government
in arranging for attorney-client consultation immediately prior to the
time when it seeks to obtain incriminating disclosures. Thus, one could
read Smith as requiring notice to the attorney as a prerequisite to waiver
only in cases where such notice is feasible. Williams, then, would mean
that when notice to the attorney is not feasible, the defendant could
waive his sixth amendment right on his own without first consulting
with his attorney.
There are two difficulties with this rule. First, the government's
access to the defendant's attorney is a matter which will inevitably be
subject to governmental manipulation. Since the government has total
discretion as to when it will seek to elicit disclosures from the defendant,
it can elect to make such an attempt at a time when the defendant's
attorney will not be physically accessible. 137 Moreover, the issue of ac-
134 In Williams, the defendant had attorneys in both Davenport, Iowa and Des Moines,
Iowa. However, at the time the interrogation took place, the defendant was in a police car
travelling between Davenport and Des Moines. The defendant's Davenport attorney had
asked for and been refused permission to accompany the defendant on the trip to Des Moines.
430 U.S. at 392. See generaly ESSAYS IN LAw, supra note 6, at 112-37.
135 In Williams the defendant disclosed incriminating information after an officer in the
police car delivered what has come to be known as the "Christian burial speech." 430 U.S. at
392-93. The Court specifically characterized this police conduct as "interrogation," 430 U.S.
at 399-401, even though such characterization was apparently unnecessary to a finding of a
sixth amendment violation. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980) (defend-
ant's sixth amendment right violated when the government "deliberately elicits" incriminat-
ing dislosures.) See generalty ESSAYS IN LAw, supra note 6, at 175-78.
136 Williams was convicted of first degree murder under IowA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (1979),
which mandated a sentence of life imprisonment.
137 Williams itself illustrates this point. If Detective Leaming had sought to interrogate
Williams before leaving Davenport, or after reaching Des Moines, Williams could easily have
been provided access to his attorney. Moreover, had Leaming complied with Williams' attor-
ney's request to join them in the police car for the trip, no problem of access would have
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cess or feasibility really seems to bear little relationship to the question
of waiver. 138 If the defendant's constitutional right is of such a nature
that consultation with an attorney is indispensable to a valid waiver of
that right, this rule should apply regardless of whether it is feasible for
the government to arrange for consultation between the defendant and
his attorney at the particular time in question.
The rule of sixth amendment waiver suggested in Smith could be
limited to cases in which the government is seeking to conduct a psychi-
atric examination. The justification for drawing the line at this point
would be that the decision as to whether the defendant should submit to
a psychiatric examination is one that is "difficult. . . even for an attor-
ney" in that it involves considerations of trial strategy as well as an eval-
uation of the propensities of the particular psychiatrist involved.' 39
Because the decision involved is so complex and so clearly beyond the
understanding of ordinary defendants, there might be grounds for say-
ing that most defendants would need to consult with an attorney before
they could appreciate the value of receiving an attorney's advice on this
decision.
However, there are problems with this analysis. First, the Court
has never held that a defendant's appreciation of the value of receiving
an attorney's advice is essential to a valid sixth amendment waiver.140
Moreover, if this approach were adopted, there is really no basis for
concluding that defendants would be less likely to understand the value
of receiving an attorney's advice as to whether they should consent to a
psychiatric exam than they would the value of receiving an attorney's
advice as to whether they should agree to participate in a more tradi-
tional form of government interrogation. A defendant's lack of familiar-
ity with the psychiatric exam would likely heighten his caution, thus
reducing the probability that he would willingly rely on his own judg-
ment. With respect to traditional police questioning, on the other hand,
there is a greater possibility that a defendant's familiarity with the pro-
arisen. In Williamrs, it seems highly probable that the police chose to interrogate (or attempt
to elicit incriminating disclosures from) the defendant when they did so precisely because they
knew that no consultation between the defendant and his attorney could take place at that
time.
138 If the concept of feasibility is to be viewed broadly so that the government's prior op-
portunities to seek incriminating disclosures from the defendant may be taken into account,
courts will be placed in the unfortunate position of seeming to pass on the good faith of the
government.
139 101 S. Ct. at 1877.
140 On the contrary, lower courts have generally taken the view that in the pretrial context,
a defendant may waive his constitutional rights so long as he has a basic understanding of the
right itself. While a full appreciation ofthe right might be necessary to an optimal decision, it
is not indispensable to a valid waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 932
(D.C. Cir. 1978); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47, 243 A.2d 240, 251 (1968).
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cedure would lead him to underestimate the value of receiving an attor-
ney's advice before making his own decision as to whether or not to
waive his constitutional rights. Thus, in this latter situation, there is at
least an equal risk that a defendant would fail to appreciate the value of
consulting with an attorney before making a decision as to whether to
waive his fifth and sixth amendment rights.
The final approach to distinguishing the cases is to hold that the
rule suggested in Smith will-apply only in capital cases.14 1 The primary
rationale for adopting this distinction would be that in capital cases the
courts must tighten the safeguards relating to waiver because the poten-
tial application of the death penalty is itself a factor which will distort
the defendant's decision-making process. 142
The Court has implicitly recognized this principle in other con-
texts. In Fay v. Noia 143 one of the issues before the Court was whether
the defendant had made an intelligent waiver of his right to appeal his
state conviction for murder. 144 The defendant had been convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 45 The defend-
ant failed to appeal his state court conviction. At his habeas corpus
hearing, it was established that the defendant was aware of his right to
appeal. 146 However, his attorney testified that an important considera-
tion in the defendant's decision not to exercise his right of appeal was his
"fear that if successful he might get the death sentence if convicted on a
retrial."1 47 The Court found that under these circumstances the validity
of the defendant's waiver was vitiated by the fact that he was confronted
with "the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprisonment or
to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might well
have led to a retrial and death sentence."' 48 The Court declined to hold
that the injection of the death penalty into the decision-making process
141 That is, the rule will apply in all cases as to which the defendant is charged with a
capital offense. Since the rationale for the rule is that a defendant's knowledge that the
death-penaty is a possible consequence will distort his decision-making ability, see text ac-
companying note 148 infra, a question could arise as to whether the rule should apply in
capital cases as to which the defendant did not receive notice that the death penalty was a
possibility when the sixth amendment right was waived and no death penalty was ever in fact
imposed. In these cases, it is arguable that the potential application of the death penalty was
not likely to impair the defendant's decision-making.
142 An additional justification for tightening the safeguards relating to waiver is that the
Court has expressed a commitment to adopting particularly strict procedural safeguards for
capital defendants. See note 54 supra.
143 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
144 Id. at 398-99.
145 Id. at 394, 440.
146 Id. at 396-97 n.3.
147 Id. at 397 n.3.
148 Id. at 440. The Court added that in Noia's case language of the sentencing judge made
the threat of the death penalty "unusually acute." Id.
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would negate the possibility of waiver in all circumstances. 149 Neverthe-
less, the Court's analysis makes it clear that whenever the possibility of
the death-penalty is a factor which may distort the defendant's decision-
making process, stricter standards of waiver are appropriate.150
If the interjection of the death penalty would tend to impair ra-
tional decision-making in the context involved in Noia, it would be even
more likely do so at the pretrial stage when the defendant is likely to
lack orientation as to the operation of the system and certainly has not
yet had an opportunity to assess the considerations relevant to a waiver
of his constitutional rights. As in Noia, a defendant's fear of the death
penalty might cause him to waive his constitutional rights without ra-
tionally weighing the risks involved.' 51 On the other hand, a defendant
with ambivalent feelings towards the death penalty would be equally ill-
equipped to make a rational judgment as to whether he should waive his
constitutional rights.' 52 In view of these concerns, it is only a modest
149 Id. at 440.
150 The Court has adhered to this analysis in cases subsequent to Noa. In United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Court considered the constitutionality of the federal kid-
napping statute. The statute was structured so that a defendant could receive a death pen-
alty only if he was found guilty by a jury; he could avoid any possibility of the death penalty
so long as he waived jury trial. The Court held that the death penalty provision of the statute
was unconstitutional because it placed undue pressure upon defendants to plead guilty or to
waive jury trial. In Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978), however, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute which provided that defendants guilty of first
degree murder could possibly avert a sentence of life imprisonment by entering a plea of non
vult or nolo contendere to the charge. The statute provided that while defendants convicted
by a jury of first degree murder would be sentenced to life, defendants allowed to enter a plea
of non vult or nolo contendere to the charge would be sentended to either life or a term of not
more than 30 years. The Court distinguishedjackson primarily on the ground that the death
penalty was involved in that case but not in Corbitt. Id. at 217. While admitting that the New
Jersey statute placed some pressure upon defendants to waive their right to jury trial, the
Court concluded that the pressure was of a different magnitude than that involved in Jackson,
Id., and, therefore, was insufficient to render the New Jersey statute unconstitutional. Id. at
226. Since these cases deal with the question of what conditions may be placed on the exer-
cise of a constitutional right, see generally Coffee, "Twisting Slowly in the Wind": A Search for
Constitutional Limits on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 211, they are not
directly germane to the present issue. Nevertheless, they further illustrate the Court's view
that injecting the death-penalty into the defendant's decision-making process may have the
effect of substantially impeding (or even destroying) the rationality of that process.
151 A defendant's overwhelming desire to avoid the death penalty might easily lead him to
believe that he could best achieve this goal by placating the government's desire to obtain
incriminating information against him.
152 An unaided defendant who waived his rights because of a conscious or unconscious
desire to be executed could not ordinarily be considered a rational decision-maker. Because
there is a risk that such a defendant is essentially consenting to execution, issues relating to the
defendant's competency are ineluctably raised. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012
(1976), in which a closely divided Court upheld a capital defendant's waiver of any and all
federal rights but only on the premise "that the State's determinations of his competence to
waive his rights knowingly and intelligently were firmly grounded." Id. at 1015 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
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step to hold, as Smith suggests, that a capital defendant who is repre-
sented by an attorney can not waive his sixth amendment right at a
pretrial stage unless he first consults with his attorney.
Indeed, based upon preexisting sixth amendment doctrine, it would
appear that the rule suggested by Smith should be pushed at least one
step further. If the basis for the rule is that the death penalty vitiates the
defendant's ability to make an uncounselled choice as to whether to as-
sert his sixth amendment right, then the rule should not be limited to
cases in which the defendant is actually represented by counsel. The
defendant's need for consultation is certainly the same regardless of
whether he happens to be represented by counsel. Accordingly, the rule
should apply to all cases as to which a capital defendant's sixth amend-
ment right is in effect.
In Heng v. United States153 the Court held that an indicted defend-
ant's sixth amendment right was in effect at a time when he was not yet
represented by counsel. 154 Heng's holding combined with Brewer v. Wil-
liams' dicta 55 appears to establish that the sixth amendment right at-
taches at least at the point of arraignment, whether or not the defendant
is in fact represented by counsel.' 5 6 Therefore, Smith's suggested rule
should mean at least that, with respect to pretrial proceedings at which
a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable, the
capital defendant who has been arraigned can not waive his sixth
amendment right to an attorney unless he is first permitted to consult
with an attorney.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Smith appears to address the constitutional issues without
giving significant weight to the fact that they are presented in the con-
text of a capital case,' 57 the case is best understood as the Court's latest
153 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
154 In Hen,7, counsel was appointed for defendant on November 27, 1972, six days after the
government's undercover agent embarked on his effort to elicit incriminating statements from
the defendant. Id. at 266. The Court attached no significance to this sequence of events.
155 430 U.S. at 398.
156 Seegenera(y ESSAYS IN LAw, supra note 6, at 216-22. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972), the Court not only explicitly stated that "the right [to counsel] attaches at the time of
arraignment," id. at 688, but also went on to indicate that the right will attach "at or after the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id. at 689. Kirby's language
could be interpreted to mean that the government's ordering of a psychiatric exam will be
sufficient in itself to activate the defendant's sixth amendment right. Since the ordering of
any psychiatric exam denotes a judgment that, if competent, the defendant should face trial
on the charges against him, this action should be viewed as triggering the commencement of
adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant.
157 In dealing with the fifth amendment issue, the Court only indirectly indicated that its
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attempt to insure procedural fairness for capital defendants. Viewed in
this framework, Smith's result is not surprising. Nevertheless, the Court
decided the case on remarkably broad grounds. Instead of focusing
upon the lack of reliability of procedures unique to Smith's case,' 58 the
Court developed new protections for capital defendants by reaching out
to decide the case on fifth and sixth amendment grounds.
When Smith is perceived as extending the procedural protections
afforded capital defendants, the interplay between the Court's fifth and
sixth amendment holdings becomes particularly interesting. The
Court's fifth amendment analysis suggests that if the prosecution plans
to introduce a defendant's statements against him in any case resulting
in the imposition of the death penalty, a specific warning of this possible
consequence will be a prerequisite to a valid waiver of his Miranda
rights. On the other hand, under the best reading of the majority's sixth
amendment analysis, once that same defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel attaches, the defendant cannot waive this right without first
consulting with an attorney. Thus, while the majority's fifth amend-
ment analysis intimates that a defendant's knowledge that the prosecu-
tion may use his statement to obtain a death sentence will be
indispensible to a knowing waiver of his fifth amendment privilege, the
Court's sixth amendment analysis implies that this same knowledge will
be likely to distort the defendant's decision-making ability. Under such
circumstances the defendant must consult with an attorney before he
can intelligently evaluate his need for the assistance of counsel in decid-
ing whether to assert his fifth amendment privilege.
A possible explanation for the difference between the two rules is
that the Court is applying a stricter standard of waiver when the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right, rather than his Miranda right, is at issue.' 59
The Court's decisions holding that the former guarantee provides
broader protection than the latter would provide some support for
adopting a dual standard. 16° Nevertheless, it seems inappropriate to al-
low this kind of distinction to control. In the present context, the critical
analysis may be shaped by the fact that the defendant's words were used to secure the death
penalty. See text accompanying notes 52-54, 95 supra. In dealing with the sixth amendment
issue, the Court never appears to attach any significance to the fact that the issue is raised in
the context of a capital case. See 101 S. Ct. at 1876-78.
158 The Court could have decided the case on due process grounds, see note 46 supra, ruling
that the prosecution's failure to provide advance notice of Dr. Grigson's appearance as a
witness reduced Smith's potential for effective cross-examination and thereby undermined the
jury's ability to assess the reliability of the psychiatrist's prediction of dangerousness.
159 Some lower courts have expressly held that a stricter standard of waiver must be ap-
plied when the defendant's sixth amendment right is at stake. See, e.g., United States v.
Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1980). See generaly ESSAYS IN LAW, supra note 6, at
275 nn. 139-40.
160 See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
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focus should be upon the impact the death penalty will have upon a
capital defendant's decision-making capacity. If knowledge that the
death penalty is a possible consequence distorts the rationality of a de-
fendant's decision-making, the same distortion will occur whether the
defendant's decision-making takes place prior to the time that the sixth
amendment right attaches or afterwards.16' Indeed, when the police
give Miranda warnings (including the death penalty warning) to an un-
represented defendant who has not yet been arraigned, the distorting
effect of the death penalty is likely to be at its peak. Therefore, it seems
anomalous to hold that this defendant can personally waive his fifth
amendment privilege but a similar defendant who has been arraigned
will have to consult with an attorney before he will be in a position to
make the same decision.
To remove this anomaly, it is not necessary for the Court to discard
its two-track system under which the sixth amendment right to an attor-
ney affords a defendant broader protection than Miranda. Rather, the
Court merely needs to focus explicitly upon defining the standards of
waiver courts are to apply in capital cases. On this point, the Smith
opinion appears to have two important insights: (1) a defendant's
knowledge that the death penalty is a possible consequence of his deci-
sion to disclose information is indispensable to a valid waiver of Miranda
rights; and (2) defendants who know they are facing a possible death
penalty are ill-equipped to make an unaided pretrial decision which
may determine whether they shall live or die. Smith strongly suggests
that the first insight will be translated into a constitutional rule which
will require that capital defendants be given a death penalty warning
before they are allowed to waive their Miranda rights. To translate
Smith's second insight into an appropriate constitutional rule, it would
be desirable to hold that capital defendants must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to consult with an attorney before they will be allowed to waive
their fifth amendment privilege. By placing the rule of waiver on this
basis, rather than keying it to the attachment of the defendant's sixth
amendment right, the Court would focus directly upon the relevant is-
sue-that is, insuring that the defendant's decision-making be rational.
This approach will more nearly fulfill the Court's articulated objective
of establishing procedures which appear to and, in fact, afford fairness
and rationality to capital defendants. 162
291, 300 n.4 (1980). Segenera(y White, supra note 12; ESSAYS IN LAW, supra note 6, at 138-
224.
161 Ordinarily the defendant's sixth amendment right will attach at or before the time of
arraignment. See note 156 supra.
162 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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